A sense of agency can be defined as a subjective experience that I am the one who is causing 19 or generating an action. Several brain regions have been proposed as neural substrates of the 20 subjective experience; however, how the information is processed and organized by each region 21 to achieve the sense of agency still remains unclear. In this study, we have clarified the neural 22 representations corresponding to three processes namely, sensorimotor error, feeling of agency, 23 and judgment of agency. Specifically, we found that the widespread sensorimotor areas 24 represent sensorimotor error information. The right inferior parietal lobe represents the 25 information solely on self-/other-attribution even during movements, which corresponds to the 26 feeling of agency. Finally, the right inferior frontal gyrus shows a distinct representation 27 between self-and other-attribution immediately before reporting the judgment on the 28 movement attribution. These results suggest that the brain builds a sense of agency by 29 developing distinct types of information each corresponding to the three processes with the 30 passage of time.
Introduction Figure 1. A hierarchical system to form a sense of agency
Theoretical models emphasize that the sense of agency arises through multiple steps from 86 sensorimotor to cognitive level. This schematic represents an overview combing the two most 87 influential theories of the sense of agency; (1) the comparator model 11,21,23 (left) and (2) the 88 two-step account of agency 24 (right). Accumulation of sensorimotor information, which is 89 mainly prediction error, contributes to experiencing the feeling of agency. Through the above 90 process, we can achieve the judgment of agency, which is equivalent to self-or other-attribution 91 in our experiment. The background color depicts gradation from sensorimotor to cognitive 92 level.
94
Results 95 Inside the fMRI scanner, 18 participants traced a five-cycle sinusoidal target with a 96 cursor on a screen by controlling a joystick ( Fig. 2A) . Data from seven-participants were 97 eliminated from the following analysis to ensure homogeneity of action attribution process (see 98 Supplementary Results for more detailed description on participant's rejection for fMRI 99 analysis). They were instructed to move the cursor at a half-cycle of a wave in 1 s (i.e., 0.5 Hz) 100 and complete a single continuous movement within the 10-s Move period. In each trial, we 50% condition, the upper limit of 95% confidence interval (CI) of the cursor-joystick positional 144 error was lower than zero from 2 s after the onset of the movement (red line in Fig. 3B ). 145 Similarly, the 95% CI of the velocity error was less than zero from 3 s after the onset of the 146 movement (orange line in Fig. 3B ). This negative correlation indicates that the more the cursor-147 joystick positional or velocity error was, the more likely were the participants to judge the 148 cursor movements to be attributed to other's motion, and vice versa. The negative correlation 149 gradually became larger according to error accumulation, which was calculated as the mean 150 from movement onset to every second (red and orange lines in Fig. 3C show for self 50% 151 condition, and in Supplementary Fig. S3 , show for all conditions). This result indicates that the 152 accumulation of error between cursor and joystick is important for the judgment of self-other 153 attribution. By contrast, the correlation coefficients for the target-cursor and target-joystick 154 errors were stable around zero (blue and green lines in Fig. 3B and 3C) . 155 Although the joystick position was not displayed on the screen, participants could 156 predict the actual position and velocity of their joystick on the screen according to their 10 proxies for a prediction error of sensory feedback. Time courses of correlations between the 163 errors and the self-other rating score (red and orange lines in Fig. 3B and 3C ) indicate that the 164 accumulation of prediction error explains a large part of variance in self-other attribution. between each behavioral measure and self-other rating scores during the 10-s Move period.
175
The values of behavioral measures were averaged within every second. Colored shaded area 176 denotes 95% confidence intervals. Note that the data in self 50% condition is shown. Negative 177 correlation indicates that the more the error was, the lower the score (i.e., more other- second. Colored shaded area denotes 95% confidence intervals. Note that the data in self 50% 182 condition is shown. Negative correlation indicates that the more the error was accumulated, the 183 lower the score the participants selected.
185
Decoding "prediction error" 186 Having identified the behavioral measures, which are proxies for a prediction error, we 187 investigated the neural correlates of a prediction error. We decoded the cursor-joystick 188 positional and velocity errors from a regional multi-voxel pattern (searchlight analysis 33 , see 189 Methods: Decoding "prediction error" with a multi-voxel pattern regression for more details). 190 We first trained a linear support vector regression (SVR) decoder with the trials for self 100% 191 and 0% conditions and then applied the trained decoder to the trials in self 75%, 50% and 25% 192 conditions, separately. Notably, we averaged the cursor-joystick error from 3 s to 9 s after the 193 onset of the Move period to exclude periods when cursor position was not clearly visible on 194 the screen (see Methods: Task procedure for the detailed description). We predicted the mean 195 13 error from the multi-voxel pattern by using SVR. As a result, we could decode the cursor-196 joystick positional error not only in the sensorimotor area but also in the parietal and visual 197 regions (the magenta regions in Fig. 4A , p < 0.01 FWE-corrected at cluster-level with a cluster 198 forming threshold p < 0.0005). Similar results were obtained for the velocity error (the cyan 199 regions in Fig. 4B ). In the first cycle, we could not find any clusters showing significant 200 decoding performance. This is reasonable because the cursor was not displayed for the first 201 two seconds. These results indicate that the broader areas of the brain are related to prediction 202 error information. 215 We decoded self-other attribution of movement, which were evaluated by the participants after 216 movement, from fMRI voxel patterns during the tracing. The participants could not always 217 evaluate with a clear gradation from self to other in the self-other mixed conditions although 218 they were asked to make judgments on a Likert scale. Therefore, we chose classification 219 analysis rather than regression analysis to investigate the predictability of self-/other-attribution. 220 We first allocated the self-or the other-attribution label to the trials with a higher or a lower 221 rating score, respectively, than the mean score across the self 100% and 0% conditions (mean: 222 5.42, SD: 0.33 across participants). The support vector machine (SVM) classifier was trained 223 with the trials in self 100% and 0% conditions in which distinct activity patterns were expected 224 to appear. Then the classifier was tested for its prediction accuracy with the trials in self 75%, 225 50% and 25% conditions, separately (see Methods: Decoding self-other attribution with a 226 multi-voxel pattern classification for more details). Supplementary Table S1 ). At first, the cluster in the basal ganglia Supplementary Table S1 ) showed the significant accuracies. These results indicate that not only 238 the posterior parietal regions, which were frequently reported in previous studies [13] [14] [15] 17, 34, 35 , but 239 also the sensorimotor and higher visual areas contained information that could predict the 240 following self-/other-attribution, and that the neural representation shifted over time during the 241 tracing.
Multi-voxel pattern classification of self-/other-attribution during movement

242
However, it is still unclear whether the classification was based on a prediction error 243 (sensorimotor processing) or self-other rating score (conscious experience of self-agency). We 
252
Next, we confirmed, by using a multivariate regression analysis, whether the activity 253 patterns in the above four regions can directly decode the self-other rating score (without the 254 above classification). We found that the decoding performance in the left pallidum/putamen 255 (t10 = 3.88, p = 0.012 Bonferroni corrected, two-tailed one-sample t-test for z-scores of the 256 correlation coefficients after permutation) and right IPL (t10 = 3.96, p = 0.011 Bonferroni 257 corrected) reached significance although those in the left precentral gyrus and right V5/MT+ 258 did not (t10 = 2.10, p = 0.25 and t10 = 2.45, p = 0.14 Bonferroni corrected, respectively). Taken 259 together, the above findings suggest that neural representation in the left pallidum/putamen and 260 right IPL are more sensitive to conscious experience of self-other agency as compared to 261 prediction error. 262 We further investigated the temporal changes in classification performance (z-score, 263 see Evaluation of classification accuracy in individual analysis in Methods section) at the peak 264 voxels of the clusters in the left pallidum/putamen and right IPL (Fig. 5B ). In the left 265 pallidum/putamen, the z-score reached the peak at around the second cycle (time bin 2) and 266 gradually decreased over time. Meanwhile, performance in the right IPL gradually increased Multi-voxel pattern classification of self-/other-attribution after movement 291 We applied the classification analysis to the data during the Delay period (the interval 292 between the offset of Move period and the onset of Rate period). As a result, the classification 293 accuracies in the right IFG, specifically Brodmann areas 44 and 45, and VLPFC were 294 significantly above the chance level ( Supplementary Fig. S4A , p < 0.01 FWE-corrected at 295 cluster-level with a cluster forming threshold p < 0.0005; all the clusters are reported in 296 Supplementary Table S2 ). It might be possible that activity for preparation of an action with 297 their right hands to select a rating score in the Rate period contributes to the high accuracy in 298 the left sensorimotor areas. However, it is remarkable that the significant accuracies in the right 299 prefrontal regions appeared only after the Move period. The current study explored the neural representation corresponding to individual 303 processes in a theoretical concept of a hierarchical system for a sense of agency ( Fig. 1) . We 304 first found that attribution judgments were tightly linked to accumulation of a prediction error, 305 which resulted from comparison between predicted and actual sensory feedback ( Fig. 3B and 306 3C). The MVPA revealed that the widespread area of the sensorimotor and parietal regions 307 represented the prediction error information from the early stage of the Move period ( Fig. 4 ).
308
Secondly, in classifying self-/other-attribution, we found the regions in the sensorimotor, 309 posterior parietal and higher visual cortices to contain discriminative information. Most of the 310 regions overlapped those related to prediction error (i.e., low-level sensorimotor information); 311 however, the left putamen and right IPL showed significant performance solely in decoding 312 self-/other-attribution ( Fig. 5A ). Finally, the voxel patterns in the right IFG and VLPFC could 313 significantly discriminate self-from other-attribution only after movement ( Supplementary Fig.   314 S4A). Our findings demonstrate that the brain develops distinct types of information with the 315 passage of time to build up the sense of agency.
316
The theoretical models 23,24,36 suggest that a hierarchical system consisting of (1) 317 sensorimotor, (2) non-conceptual feeling and (3) conceptual judgment processes, is 318 21 fundamental to the sense of agency (Fig. 1 ). We found that prediction error information and 319 self-other attribution could be predicted by the voxel patterns in the different clusters 320 respectively (Fig. 5A ). We assumed that the regions, which can decode prediction error 321 information, can contribute to the first sensorimotor process of the hierarchical system.
322
Meanwhile, those, which can predict self-other attribution, are responsible for higher-order 323 functions, rather than low-level sensorimotor processing. We also found the distinct areas 324 which show significant classification performance in self-/other attribution during the 325 movement ( Fig. 5A ) or after the movement ( Supplementary Fig. S4A ). Considering the role of 326 feeling of agency to take over sensorimotor information from the first process, the neural 327 processing for feeling of agency might appear before the processing for the judgment of agency.
328
Therefore, it is plausible that the regions, which could classify self-/other-attribution during 329 movement, mainly contribute to the second non-conceptual feeling process, while those, which 330 could classify self-/other-attribution after movement, are highly involved in the final judgment 331 process.
332
A comparator model proposed that a prediction error is the main factor determining 333 action attribution 21, 23 . Consistent with the model, our data demonstrated the tight relationship 334 between trial-by-trial cursor-joystick positional and velocity errors, which were proxies for a 335 prediction error, and self-other rating score ( Fig. 3B and 3C ). Such errors could be predicted 336 by voxel patterns in the widespread areas of the sensorimotor, posterior parietal and visual 337 22 cortices (Fig. 4) . Thus, these were mainly responsible for the first sensorimotor process. 338 We found the two clusters, the left putamen (in the second cycle) and the right IPL (in 339 the last cycle) as regions where we could solely decode self-/other-attribution but not decode 340 prediction error information (Fig. 5A ). However, we conclude that the right IPL is only a 341 plausible candidate to reflect feeling of agency based on prediction error in the hierarchical 342 system ( Fig. 1) according to the following reason. While the classification performance in the 343 right IPL gradually increased during movement, the performance in the left putamen reached 344 the peak at the second cycle ( Fig. 5B ). In the second cycle, a correlation between a prediction 345 error (cursor-joystick positional or velocity error) and a self-other rating score was relatively 346 low (Fig. 3B) , and information on the prediction error was not sufficiently accumulated to be 347 reflected in a rating score (Fig. 3C) . Moreover, the putamen is mainly involved in automatic Previous studies implicate that the right IPL contributes to the process for non- cortex and contribute to a subjective experience of self-agency 42 , thus suggesting that the right 364 IPL is responsible for higher-order function, rather than low-level sensorimotor processing, in 365 the system for the sense of agency. In our case, the right IPL received prediction error 366 information processed in the broader areas of the sensorimotor regions to make participants 367 experience self-agency. 368 We found high classification performance in the right IFG (specifically Brodmann areas 369 44 and 45) and VLPFC only during the Delay period, which was followed by the Rate period 370 ( Supplementary Fig. S4A ). Because participants were likely to determine their rating score in 371 this period, we assumed that these regions were mainly responsible for the judgment process.
372
This assumption is supported by the fact that the time courses of classification performance (z-373 score) reached the peak value only after movement at the peak voxels in the right IFG and 374 VLPFC ( Supplementary Fig. S4B ). In addition, these right inferior frontal cortices are known 375 24 to be recruited for recognition of self-face or self-bodily features 6,7,9,46-49 . Self-recognition 376 requires one to evaluate bodily features in relation to perceptual or mental image of oneself and 377 to attribute them to self or other 2 . These studies suggest that the right IFG and VLPFC might 378 contribute to the conceptual judgment step in the hierarchical system (Fig. 1) . 379 The clusters we found in the right prefrontal cortices are parts of the right inferior 380 branch of the superior longitudinal fasciculus tract (SLF III) 50 . The IFG is densely connected 381 with the right IPL through the inferior part of the SLF III 51 . Importantly, this fronto-parietal 382 network contributes not only to recognition of self-body 47-49 but also to awareness of our bodily 383 sensations 47,52 . These findings proposed the idea that the network is a neural basis of bodily 384 self-consciousness 49 . The right IFG and VLPFC (the third process) densely communicate with 385 the right IPL (the second process) to build conceptual judgment of agency by referring to 386 feeling of agency represented in the right IPL.
387
There exist several possible confounding factors in the MVPA. The first factor is the 388 difference in attention level to control the cursor whether the participants felt the cursor 389 movement was attributed to self or controlled by other. The possible scenario would be as 390 follows: participants might find it more difficult to precisely control the cursor in the presence 391 of an external agent controlling the cursor. This would suggest that the more strongly the 392 participants felt the cursor was controlled by an external agent, the more attention they might 393 have paid towards controlling the cursor. In that case, we could have only decoded different 394 25 levels of attention covarying with action attribution. We checked if the attention level correlated 395 with a rating score of the self-/other-attribution. Although we cannot directly measure the level 396 of attention on cursor control, it can be inferred from accuracy in participant's tracing 397 performance, which was measured by error between the target path and the cursor position 398 (target-cursor error). Note that participants were instructed to precisely trace the target path 399 with the cursor even in self-other mixed condition. The target-cursor error did not correlate 400 with the rating score (the blue line in Fig. 3B ), suggesting that the attention on cursor control 401 was not a crucial factor to classify the self-and the other-attribution judgment. The second 402 factor is difference in rating number participants prepared in their mind prior to the Rate period. 403 We instructed them to judge action attribution on a 9-point Likert scale. Although the Rate 404 period was temporally apart from the Move and Delay period, it might be possible that 405 participants kept the rating number in mind before the Rate period. The right IPL was suggested 406 to be involved in a magnitude system of numerical processing 53 . Thus, we might have decoded 407 the difference in the rating number from activity patterns in the right IPL even before the Rate 408 period. However, the cluster in the right IPL disappeared once entering the Delay period ( Fig.   409 5B), suggesting that numerical processing was not the crucial factor of our successful 410 classification.
411
To answer how the brain organizes multistep processes in a hierarchical system for a 412 sense of agency, we employed the two strategies. The first was the unique experimental 413 paradigm considering temporal evolution of self-agency [25] [26] [27] . Most previous studies required 414 participants to perform an intermittent action such as a button press (e.g., reference 15 ) or a 415 reaching movement (e.g., reference 12 ). However, such simple tasks rather made it difficult to 416 dissociate the multistep processes and, consequently, to clarify a role of different brain regions.
417
In our experiment, participants continuously received sensorimotor evidence while tracing a 418 target path under the ambiguous condition so that they could gradually realize whether cursor 419 movement was attributed to self or other. Thus, our task paradigm enabled us to separately 420 investigate individual processes from sensorimotor processing to cognitive judgment of agency.
421
The other strategy was to apply a MVPA to fMRI data [28] [29] [30] . Almost all the previous 422 studies used the mass univariate rather than multivariate analysis to identify the regions 423 responsible for either self-or other-agency (reviews 18,19 ). However, it has been unclear how the 424 brain integrates information represented in different regions, each of which is related to self-425 or other-agency, and constructs a unified judgment about action attribution. Our MVPA results 426 demonstrate that the right IPL and the right inferior frontal cortices respectively modulated 427 their neural activity patterns to reflect feeling and judgment of self-/other-agency ( Fig. 5 and 428 Supplementary Fig. S4 ). This suggests that these areas act as prime candidates for integrating 429 individual information about self-or other-agency processed in multiple brain regions. We have 430 confirmed that it is unlikely that the MVPA result (Fig. 5) would only reflect the difference in 431 the regional activation level (for more details see Supplementary Results: Mass univariate 432 analysis of voxel-wise activation with self-and other-attribution judgment and Supplementary 433 Fig. S5 ).
434
In 1890, William James proposed the concept of the 'I' as one aspect of the self: 435 experiencing oneself as a subjective agent of thought, perception and action 1 . Our study has 436 revealed the mechanism underlying awareness of ourselves as an agent of an action in the brain 437 through interaction with the external world, which is, as it were, the neural basis of the 'I'. 438 Wegner 54 suspected that self-agency is a trick of the mind induced by a cognitive inference 439 about relationships between thoughts and actions. Our study does not deny the importance of 440 the cognitive inference in the determination of self-agency but demonstrated that results of 441 sensorimotor processing evolve subjective feeling and contributes to the cognitive judgment of 442 agency in the brain. Thus, a sense of agency is not limited to a cognitive system but is grounded 443 in subjective experience based on the sensorimotor system. was conducted with power selected at 0.8, effect size (f) at 0.4 and alpha at 0.05. The sample 451 size was chosen as 18 because the analysis determined 16 to be optimum. We eliminated data 452 from seven participants from the analysis to ensure homogeneity of action attribution process 453 (for more details see Supplementary Results: Participants' rejection from fMRI analysis). Note 454 that the statistical power for the main effect was still high (more than 0.99) even after the 455 exclusion of the participants. We eventually analyzed the fMRI data of eleven participants with how much they felt the cursor movement to be attributed to their own joystick movement on a 470 9-point Likert scale from 1 (completely other's movement) to 9 (completely their own 471 movement). The number 5 was displayed on the screen at the beginning of a Rate period for 8 472 s ( Fig. 2A) . The number was incremented or decremented by one with the press of the right or 473 left button, respectively. The buttons were attached to the joystick box, and participants were 474 instructed to press the buttons with their right hand. Note that the cursor was not displayed on 475 the screen during the first 1.5 s and the last 0.5 s of the Move period because the onset and the 476 offset of the cursor movement are sensitive to the mismatch between their own joystick and 477 cursor movement, which predominantly affects self-other attribution judgment. Fig. 2C ). By contrast, in the self 0% condition, the visible cursor position was independent 490 of their own joystick position (the cursor labeled with the number 1 in Fig. 2C ). In the self-491 other mixed conditions, the cursor was displayed at a position between the position of their 492 own joystick and that of his/her pre-recorded joystick (the cursor labeled with number 2, 3 or 493 4 in Fig. 2C ). We instructed the participants to trace the target path with the cursor as closely 494 as possible even if the movement of others was strongly felt during the cursor control.
495
Experimental procedure: Before the main fMRI runs, participants performed two types of 496 practice runs inside the fMRI scanner. In the first practice run, the participants were trained to 497 trace the target path with a cursor in accordance with 1-Hz metronomic sounds to get 498 accustomed to the cyclic movement. In this run, the cursor movement precisely reflected their 499 joystick movement (self 100% condition). In the second practice run, they conducted the same 500 task as the main fMRI runs but the number of trials was smaller (10 trials) than that of the main 501 runs (50 trials/run). After the practice runs, participants conducted three main runs/day (150 502 trials), and total six runs (300 trials) for two days. The participants underwent the five morphing 503 ratios ten times in a random order during each of the main runs. 
516
Preprocessing of fMRI data 517 The fMRI data were analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, 518 London, UCL) on MATLAB. We discarded the first three volumes of the functional images in 519 each run to allow for T1 equilibration. The remaining image volumes were temporally 520 realigned to correct for the sequence of slice acquisition and spatially realigned to the first 521 image to adjust for motion-related artifacts. Rigid-body transformations were performed to 522 align the functional images to the structural image for each subject. The images were spatially 523 normalized with the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) (Montreal, Quebec, Canada) 524 reference brain and resampled into 3×3×4 mm cuboid voxels. Note that spatial smoothing was 525 32 not applied to the data. After linear trend removal within each run, we calculated the percent 526 signal change relative to the mean of activity for each run.
527
Decoding "prediction error" with a multi-voxel pattern regression 528 We performed multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to investigate whether the brain 529 regions contained enough information to predict the prediction error (the positional or velocity 530 error between the cursor and the joystick). A linear support vector regression (SVR) model 531 implemented in LIVSVM (http://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvm/) was applied to the voxel 532 patterns in each volume with trial-by-trial prediction error as a dependent variable. Note that 533 we used the mean of the prediction error from 3 s to 9 s after the onset of the Move period to 534 exclude periods when the cursor was not clearly visible on the screen (for more detail see 535 above: Behavioral task). The regression analysis was applied to voxel patterns within a 9-mm 536 radius sphere (see below: Searchlight decoding over the brain) extracted from each volume of 537 fMRI data scanned every 2 s (TR = 2 s) during the Move period. Each volume corresponded 538 to a cycle of the sinusoidal movement. The model was trained with data of the trials in the self 539 100% and 0% conditions and then tested with data of the trials in the other three conditions, 540 separately. We evaluated the decoding performance by using a leave-one-run-out cross 541 validation procedure separately for each participant and each condition. More specifically, we 542 trained the regression model with the fMRI data in five out of six runs and tested with the 543 independent data in the remaining run. This procedure was repeated six times to become each 544 33 run as test data once.
545
Evaluation of decoding accuracy in individual analysis:
We evaluated the above decoding 546 accuracy by calculating z-scores of Fisher-transformed Pearson's correlation coefficient 547 following the permutation procedure 55,56 as follows. We generated 1000-surrogate correlation 548 coefficients by permutating the relationship between the actual and predicted "prediction error" 549 1000 times to get empirical distribution of correlation coefficient. We calculated the z-scores 550 of the original (without the permutation) value based on the empirical distribution. We applied 551 the above steps to each condition of test dataset (self 75%, 50% or 25% condition). We regarded 552 z-scores averaged across conditions as decoding performance for each participant before 553 performing a group-level analysis (see below).
554
Searchlight decoding over the brain: We performed a volume-based searchlight decoding 555 analysis 33,57 . We repeatedly extracted voxel patterns within a 9-mm radius sphere containing 556 at least 65 voxels to perform classification analysis. This sphere was moved over the gray 557 matter of the whole brain and was assigned the mean of z-scores to the central voxel of a sphere, 558 resulting in the 3-D accuracy map for each participant. The z-score maps were smoothed with 559 a 4-mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel. A random-effects group 560 analysis was performed on the smoothed accuracy maps by using SPM8. We applied a 561 statistical threshold of p < 0.01 (FWE-corrected at cluster-level with a cluster forming threshold 562 p < 0.0005).
563
